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A STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE
UNITED STATES TREASURY
DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE NATION'S
BANKING SYSTEM
JILL M. CONSIDINE *
INTRODUCTIONT HE theme of your Colloquium is "The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration." That transformation surely encompasses a
broader spectrum of financial institutions than S&Ls, and it could precip-
itate a crisis for the dual banking system, that unique blend of state and
federal institutions. Any restructuring of the entire financial services in-
dustry will have a profound impact on the nation's regulatory structure.
The primary casualty of the S&L crisis was not insolvent thrifts, or
shareholders left holding worthless paper, or even the taxpayers. The
primary casualty was public confidence in our banking system. And gen-
uine transfiguration can only be achieved by renewal of public
confidence.
My comments today1 about the S&L crisis come from a state regula-
tor's perspective, and I will focus my discussion on its potential to harm
the dual banking system. But it should be understood that the S&L crisis
is merely part of a continuum of change, changes reflected in the statu-
tory and regulatory proposals now being advanced-changes that may
ultimately include the blending of banking and commerce.
There are few who disagree that banking reform is essential if the
United States is to maintain a safe and competitive banking system. Re-
form requires expanding bank powers, consolidating banks and eliminat-
* Jill M. Considine, Superintendent of Banks for New York State, was appointed by
Governor Cuomo in May 1985. She is a director and past Chair of the Washington-based
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and is a member of the State Liaison Committee of
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Miss Considine, whose career in
banking spans almost 20 years, was President and Chief Executive Officer of the First
Women's Bank of New York immediately prior to her appointment. Before that she was
a vice president at Bankers Trust Company and Chase Manhattan Bank, serving in a
number of capacities.
This speech was given by Superintendent Considine as part of the annual Financial
Institutions and Regulation Symposium at the Fordham University School of Law.
1. Superintendent Considine's February 17, 1991 address preceded the formal intro-
duction of the Treasury Department's bank reform legislation by several weeks, and thus
does not reflect changes made in the Department's original proposals, which were pub-
licly unveiled on February 5, 1991.
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ing geographic constraints. What it does not require, however, is blanket
homogenization or nationalization of the banking system without any
recognition of the variety of financial institutions and the markets they
serve. The dual banking system recognizes this geographic diversity and
has been a lasting strength of the American banking system for more
than 125 years.
I. THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
The starting point for any understanding of the dual banking system is
the fact that the United States Constitution gives no power to Congress
to establish banks. For the first seventy-five years of our history, there
was only state banking, except for brief periods when the First2 and Sec-
ond3 Banks of the United States were in existence. Only when the State
of Maryland sought to tax the First Bank of the United States and the
matter was taken to the Supreme Court did the great Federalist Chief
Justice John Marshall establish the right of the federal government to
create and operate a system of national banks based on a concept of pow-
ers implied by other enumerated powers that the Constitution gave
Congress.4
When the National Bank Act of 1864- was passed to finance the Civil
War, it provided for a co-equal system of national banks, regulated and
supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the
"OCC"), and state banks, regulated and supervised by state banking
departments.
The dual banking system as we know it can be dated to the Federal
Reserve Act of 19136 and the Banking Act of 1933,1 with the entry of the
federal government into the regulation of state member banks through
the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (the "FDIC"). This extraordinary duality in banking reflected
resistance to the establishment of concentrated financial power.
Although this divided system arose from a historic fear of national
power, state-chartered banking earned another, more significant role. It
is at the state and local level that banking innovations have traditionally
been developed. It is here that bankers know the needs of their custom-
ers, the strength or weakness of their local economies and the products to
offer to attract new business. And it is at the state level that supervisors
have first-hand knowledge of and experience with bank managements.
Also, state regulators often have significantly broader functional respon-
sibility and experience than their federal counterparts because they must
2. The First Bank of the United States existed from 1791 to 1811.
3. The Second Bank of the United States existed from 1816 to 1836.
4. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1819).
5. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
6. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
7. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
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typically regulate a broad range of financial entities in addition to deposi-
tory institutions.
For example, here in New York, we have responsibility for regulating
state-chartered thrifts, credit unions and banks.' At the federal level,
each of these types of financial institutions today has a different regula-
tor-the Office of Thrift Supervision (the "OTS") for national savings
banks and S&Ls, the National Credit Union Administration (the
"NCUA") for federal credit unions, and the OCC for national banks.
There are differences among the states as well. In California and Texas,
for example, there is one regulator for the S&Ls and another for com-
mercial banks.
Overlying this banking regulatory structure, which exists at the federal
and state level, is deposit insurance. For thrifts there is the Savings Asso-
ciation Insurance Fund (the "SAIF'), the successor to the Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Insurance Corporation (the "FSLIC"), and for commercial
banks there is the Bank Insurance Fund (the "BIF'). Both of these are
administered by the FDIC. When a bank, either state or federally
chartered, establishes a holding company, the Federal Reserve acquires
jurisdiction over that entity.
Proposals have recently been made that may significantly change this
layered system of regulation. They are part of the Treasury Depart-
ment's recommendations for "Modernizing the Financial System,"
which were part of a report published in February 1991. 9 What will
eventually be enacted by Congress is anyone's guess, however, and I can
only offer my assessment of these various proposals and make my own
suggestions.
As New York's Superintendent of Banks for almost six years as well as
a past chair of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (the "CSBS")-
an organization representing fifty-four regulatory agencies supervising
9,000 state-chartered banks in fifty states, three territories and the Dis-
trict of Columbia-I know the scope of state supervisory responsibility in
general and view it with a renewed sense of respect.
In addition to commercial banks and savings banks, my state col-
leagues and I supervise a vast number and variety of financial institu-
tions. In New York, for example, the Banking Department regulates
almost 4,000 financial institutiohs with $1 trillion in assets. Overall,
thirty-six state banking departments supervise savings and loans and
credit unions; twenty-eight supervise bank holding companies; seventeen
supervise first and second mortgage companies; forty supervise trust
companies; and twenty-eight regulate money order companies. This is
8. See N.Y. Banking Law, Articles III (Banks and Trust Companies); VI (Savings
Banks); X (Savings and Loan Associations); and XI (Credit Unions)(McKinney 1990 &
Supp. 1991).
9. Treasury Dep't, Modernizing the Financial System (1991) [hereinafter Treasury
Reform Proposal].
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certainly a far broader spectrum of financial regulation than exists at any
federal agency.
State-chartered banks range in size from a $3 million bank in Georgia
to multi-billion dollar money-center banks in New York. They represent
two-thirds of all commercial and savings banks in the nation with $1.2
trillion in deposits and $1.6 trillion in assets, roughly forty-five percent of
all the assets and deposits in the nation's banks. In addition, state-
chartered foreign agencies and branches hold $550 billion in United
States-based assets, ninety-four percent of all such assets held in this
country.
It is at the state level, too, that innovation begins, with market-driven
products and services that are often models for Congressional legislation.
Although Congress has not acted, sixteen states already authorize insur-
ance powers for their banks, twenty-seven permit securities activities,
and twenty-seven allow some sort of real estate equity investment or de-
velopment. It is the states that first allowed banks to establish branches
on a state-wide basis,10 to develop interest-bearing checking accounts,"I
and to permit electronic funds transfer, 2 automated teller machines 3
and Community Reinvestment Act (the "CRA") disclosure,14 just to
name a few state innovations that are now common throughout the bank-
ing system. And it was New York State that pioneered deposit insurance
back in 1829-more than 100 years before the FDIC was created.
New York State also established the expedited-funds-availability re-
quirements for banks, 5 rules establishing time periods for withdrawal of
funds after a deposit, which eventually became a model for Congres-
sional action. 6 Similarly, we took the lead in licensing foreign bank
branches and agencies 7 and in establishing credit card disclosure rather
than upper-limit caps on interest rates.'" Even in the area of interstate
10. See The Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State of the State Banking System
8 (1989) [hereinafter State Banking System]; see generally, The Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, Profile of State-Chartered Banking 111-19 (13th ed. 1990)(listing banks per-
mitting branches on state-wide basis) [hereinafter State-Chartered Banking].
11. See State Banking System, supra note 9, at 8.
12. See The American Bankers Ass'n., State Bank Law Service 180 (1978)(Massachu-
setts, Oregon and Washington permitted electronic funds transfer before federal govern-
ment); State Banking System, supra note 9, at 8 (1989); see generally Profile of State-
Chartered Banking, supra note 9, at 245-47 (listing states permitting electronic funds
transfer).
13. See State Banking System, supra note 9, at 8; see generally, Profile of State-
Chartered Banking, supra note 9, at 248-50 (listing states permitting automated teller
machines).
14. See State Banking System, supra note 9, at 9.
15. See N.Y. Banking Law § 14-d (McKinney 1990); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 3, §§ 34.1-34.6 (1989).
16. See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101
Stat. 552 (1987); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.1-.42 (relating to fund availability, disclosure
and collection of checks)(Reg CC)(1990).
17. See N.Y. Banking Law Article V (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1991).
18. See, eg., N.Y. Banking Law § 108(5)(b) (McKinney 1990)(disclosure of changes
in lending rates); Gen. Bus. Law § 519 (McKinney 1990)(disclosure by commercial estab-
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banking, progress was made at the state level and I think the result was
far superior to anything Congress could have fashioned from both a
political and regulatory perspective. New York acted in 1981 to allow
reciprocal interstate banking. 9
And in 1986, New York, in response to the needs of some of its mul-
tinational banks, issued an interpretation of the "engaged principally"
language of the Glass-Steagall Act,2" signalling our determination to
loosen strictures against bank participation in securities underwriting.
Glass-Steagall,21 passed by Congress in 1933, was intended to insulate
bank depositors from the perceived risks involved when commercial
banks dealt in securities, owned brokerage firms or engaged in invest-
ment banking activities such as underwriting. In New York State we
have our own version, called the "mini" Glass-Steagall Act.' Our "en-
gaged principally" interpretation allowed banks to participate in securi-
ties underwriting up to twenty-five percent of assets to enable both large
money-center banks and smaller banks to participate.' Similar flexibil-
ity, though only with a significantly lower percentage of assets, and thus
practical only for large money-center banks, was subsequently granted
under Federal Reserve and OCC interpretations of the federal statute.
Again and again, it is the local financial institutions and state regula-
tors that take the lead in the development and supervision of banking and
other financial services. Obviously, the current Treasury reform propo-
sal is trying to create new momentum for reform in this session of Con-
gress, even though many members are still wary of deregulation
following the thrift crisis. So it is up to those of us who want reform-
and almost all regulators do-to convince those who fear further deregu-
lation that their fears are misplaced. Let me spend some time describing
deregulation of the thrift industry, deregulation that was appropriate and
necessary but did not go far enough.
II. THE THRIFr CRISIS
Bankers and bank regulators often look back to the 1950s as the good
old days and picture a time when there were simple rules, when bankers
exuded confidence and banks epitomized security. We had learned the
economic lessons from the 1920s and 1930s, we had grown rich in the
years immediately following World War II, and the financial community
lishments honoring credit cards); Gen. Bus. Law § 520 (McKinney 1990)(disclosure in
application forms or solicitation for credit cards).
19. See N.Y. Banking Law § 142-b (McKinney 1990).
20. See Letter from Barbara T. Barrantes, Deputy Superintendent of Banks and
Counsel, to Paul L. Lee, Shearman & Sterling (May 4, 1987); Letter from Jill M. Consi-
dine, Superintendent of Banks, to Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. and Bankers Trust Co.
(Dec. 23, 1986).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
22. See N.Y. Banking Law § 103(9) (McKinney 1990).
23. See supra note 19.
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was doggedly pursuing its mission of financing America's unprecedented
growth.
The rules were rigid and flexibility was nil. It was banking by the
numbers: numbers three, six, three. You borrowed at three percent,
loaned it out at six, and hit the golf course by threel And that was all
there was to it. As simplistic as it sounds, it does characterize the bank-
ing environment before deregulation, just as it helps us to understand the
origins of the thrift crisis and the remedies that were introduced to re-
form the system.
It is fair to say that the thrift crisis is the most serious banking failure
since the Great Depression: certainly it is in terms of dollars lost and the
obligations it imposes on us as taxpayers; certainly it is in its enormous
ancillary impact on all other financial institutions, including a pervasive
loss of public confidence in the entire banking system.
Years ago, when Congress first determined that there was a need for a
separate set of financial institutions devoted to home financing, it created
a separate federal regulatory, deposit insurance and liquidity system for
the thrift industry.' Today, critics contend that the thrift industry was
founded on an inherently flawed premise-long-term mortgages financed
by short-term deposits-but no one disputes that the system served hous-
ing finance well for at least thirty years after its creation.
So, what went wrong? The causes of our current problems are far
more complex than those looking for a simple villain in deregulation
would admit. Basically, the market changed and the system did not re-
spond, a scenario that must be avoided in any future bank deregulation.
In the 1960s, deposit interest rate control was extended to the thrift
business as a way to keep mortgage rates low by putting a lid on what
thrifts could pay depositors. This was an early warning of the serious
structural problems that were developing. Soon thereafter, various blue-
ribbon commissions and specialists began to study the industry.
In the early 1970s, the consensus view identified two emerging
problems: (i) the danger of disintermediation-the movement of funds
from low-yielding accounts at traditional banking institutions to higher
yielding investments in the general market-which stemmed from a
highly regulated depository institutions system; and (ii) the inability of
the U.S. financial system to keep pace with growing domestic and inter-
national competition.25 As a result of the findings, the call for deregula-
tion was sounded.
At first, policy makers were not listening. But in the mid-1970s, as
24. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932)(establishing Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board); National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)(es-
tablishing FSLIC).
25. See generally Wilmarth, The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Re-
sponse, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1133,
1144-47 (1990)(discussing increased competition to banks, declining bank profitability
and increased bank failures).
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money market mutual funds appeared, the specter of disintermediation
loomed large and thrifts began to lose deposits at an alarming rate. In
1977, money market funds totaled $3 billion; by 1982, the amount had
jumped to $233 billion.
Because of the importance of fixed-rate mortgages in their asset portfo-
lios, thrifts had always been vulnerable to rising interest rates. Their reli-
ance on fixed-rate mortgages-all but mandated by state usury-law
ceilings-locked them into low rates of return. As long as interest rate
fluctuations were moderate, fluctuations in thrift earnings were also
moderate.
That changed dramatically in the late 1970s when inflationary pres-
sure boosted interest rates substantially and drove up the cost of funds.
Depository institutions experienced substantial deposit outflows, interest
ceilings at banks and thrifts were raised, new deposit instruments were
developed and eventually deposit rate ceilings were eliminated alto-
gether. In New York, for example, our thrifts had to pay ten percent or
more to attract deposits, yet were still prevented by usury laws from
charging more than 8.5% for mortgages.
Regulator reaction was slow. At first thrifts were allowed to issue
longer-term certificates at somewhat higher rates. Later, in 1978, short-
term, competitively priced six-month certificates were approved. It soon
became apparent that regulators had no choice but to relax rigid deposit
rate constraints if the housing industry was to be assured a continuing
flow of mortgage credit. As the cost of funds increased at thrifts, how-
ever, interest margins declined sharply, turning negative in 1980 and re-
maining negative through 1982. As a result, thrifts experienced
substantial operating losses. Between 1980 and 1983, about 470 FSLIC-
insured institutions were closed or merged to avoid failure. In New York
State alone, sixty-nine thrifts, both savings banks and S&Ls, were merged
into healthy state and federal institutions.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 198026 was the result of a national effort to deregulate deposits. That
Act initiated the phased, six-year deregulation of bank and thrift deposit
rates. But it was only the liability side of the ledger that was deregulated.
You could pay market rates for funds but were still limited as to where
they could be placed.
While the Act accomplished its aim of deregulating the deposit side,
where the disintermediation problems were readily apparent, it neglected
to deal with the asset side. This was recognized later and hurried at-
tempts were made over the next two years to grant new asset powers in
three major ways: (i) by federal legislation; (ii) by action of certain state
legislatures; and (iii) by the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982.27 No one could have envisioned how imprudently these
26. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
27. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
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powers would in some cases be used.
To add to all the other problems, thrifts in particular regions were
buffeted by deteriorating economic conditions as key sectors of local
economies took a plunge. At the time, this was clearly an important
factor in the southwestern United States, just as it is today in New Eng-
land and the Mid-Atlantic states.
To prevent the industry from being further overwhelmed, efforts were
made to bolster industry earnings and net worth in a variety of ways.
These included government-issued, capital equivalent, net worth certifi-
cates; deferred losses on asset sales; and favorable accounting treatment
in other areas, including the acquisitions of failing institutions. These de-
vices did not contribute to "real" earnings or net worth. But they
delayed technical insolvencies and bought time, allowing institutions to
stay alive while they tried to grow their way out of their problems. In
some instances the time was used well; too often, however, it was not.
For thrifts that sought to grow out of their problems, higher yielding
assets appeared to offer the best opportunity to counteract previous
losses. Some savings institutions did turn to high-risk activities in the
hopes of making quick profits. Instead, many generated further losses.
A number of these institutions simply did not have the expertise to make
such loans prudently; some were victimized by dishonest operators inside
and outside their institutions; and real estate markets subsequently dete-
riorated, most in precisely those areas where loans could most readily be
booked. Then, just as interest rate problems abated nationally, massive
asset quality problems cropped up among many institutions.
This institutional bind should not have been hard to anticipate. An
institution without capital has substantial incentive to gamble its way to
solvency. The dramatic doubling of the size of the thrift industry between
1979 and 1985 reflects at least in part the efforts of many thrifts to grow
their way out of their problems. In other sectors of the economy, credi-
tors would have prevented such expansion. But creditors have little rea-
son to exercise discipline when funding comes from government-insured
deposits.
There has been substantial debate over whether expanded powers were
good or bad for S&Ls and whether they contributed to current
problems.28 In some sense, they did contribute. However, it is important
to have some perspective on this issue and to recognize that only certain
poorly managed institutions took inappropriate risks utilizing the new
powers, while better run institutions pursued such opportunities wisely.
Congress, some state legislatures and state regulators, and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board all played a role in mismanaging the situation.
Capital requirements that were insufficient to cushion traditional thrift
28. See, e.g., N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong: A Look at the
Causes Behind S&L Failures in the 1980s 54-88 (1988)(discussing role of expanded bank
powers and relaxed regulations in S&L crisis).
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risks were certainly not sufficient to cushion riskier ones. And examina-
tion and supervisory policies were not prepared to deal with riskier asset
portfolios.
Certainly, a breakdown in supervision was a major contributor to the
problem. As many of you know, New York and many other state bank-
ing departments spend months evaluating each new charter request,
thoroughly investigating the quality and experience of proposed directors
and senior managers, assessing the competitive impact of the institution
and critically reviewing its business plan and profit projections. One
state apparently did little if any of this analysis as it chartered 200 thrifts
in 400 days. And, lest we blame only the state, remember that the then
federal insurer-the FSLIC-approved deposit insurance coverage for
these institutions.
On the whole, regulators struggled mightily to keep the system alive in
the hopes of better days ahead-but they were understaffed, underpaid,
undertrained and, frankly, overwhelmed. In part there was a failure to
recognize the dangers inherent in deregulation that was not properly
supervised.
The situation called for strong and prompt action. In New York we
were faced with rapidly eroding net worth in institutions that for too
long were earning far less on regulated assets than they were paying on
deregulated deposits. We vigorously opposed the efforts of some of our
institutions to defer loan losses or inflate their assets to prevailing market
value, actions that resulted in these sixty-nine state-chartered thrifts be-
ing merged into or acquired by stronger institutions.
At the same time, a more paternalistic Federal Home Loan Bank
Board allowed insolvent federally chartered institutions to continue to
operate in New York and elsewhere, supported mainly by accounting
gimmicks. In fairness to the Board, however, few in Congress pressed to
solve the problem. What might have been a manageable problem then
moved inexorably forward to the crisis we have today.
In fact, if there is a lesson to be learned from the decade of the 1980s, it
is this: market dynamics may drive the pendulum of change, but it is the
appropriateness of the political response that ensures the viability of the
financial system. And it is the adequacy of this political response that
will be sorely tested in the weeks and months ahead as Congress debates
the bank reform proposals put forward by Treasury.
Perhaps the clearest lesson to emerge from the thrift crisis is that de-
regulation should not mean decreased supervision. On the contrary,
greater flexibility requires greater supervision by both managements and
regulators to ensure safety and soundness.
III. BANK REFORM PROPOSALS
We have already seen how deregulation of the financial institutions
industry began in the early 1980s. While the Gain-St Germain Act
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sought to halt the thrift crisis, it also increased lending limits for national
banks and expanded the lending and investment powers of federal thrifts.
As a result, various states acted quickly to grant their state-chartered
banks and thrifts these and other new powers--some allowing direct in-
vestments in real estate, others granting banks the right to sell insurance
and still others permitting some involvement in the securities market.
Throughout the decade it was market forces that shaped the deregula-
tion of our financial institutions, but only incrementally, never in a com-
prehensive manner. Thus, the current drive towards more
comprehensive deregulation must be pushed vigorously forward if our
financial services industry is to meet today's challenges, let alone to-
morrow's. Although not an instant success and subject to criticism on
many fronts, Treasury's proposals for bank and regulatory reform will, I
hope, become the catalyst for comprehensive reform.
The most welcome of the proposals deals with the expansion of finan-
cial services.2 9 Under the plan, well-capitalized banks may own and op-
erate financial affiliates that sell or underwrite securities and mutual
funds. They would also be permitted to sell insurance if allowed by state
law. In addition, financial services holding companies would be permit-
ted to own well-capitalized banks, and non-bank businesses would be al-
lowed to own financial services holding companies. The proposals also
mandate a "safety net" and strict regulation to protect the bank, and
require separately capitalized financial affiliates, with appropriate
firewalls to insulate their insured deposits.
Of course, the proposals raise concerns because they will have a major
impact on states' abilities to exercise their regulatory authority over
state-chartered institutions. I will concentrate on four of these con-
cerns-the relationship of banking and commerce; repeal of the Douglas
amendment30 and of the McFadden Act;3 reordering of the federal regu-
latory structure; and restrictions on the powers of state-chartered
institutions.
Despite concerns among state regulators of the marked shift to federal
regulation, there is one thing in which we may all take comfort. Most of
our commercial banks are well managed, adequately capitalized, suffi-
ciently reserved and, unlike the thrift industry, protected by a multi-
tiered regulatory structure that separates the insurer from the primary
state or federal regulator. And regardless of what you read or hear, it is
decidedly unlikely that a crisis of the magnitude of the S&L debacle
could ever happen to the banks.
E. Gerald Corrigan, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, offered his assessment in a recent speech to the New York State
Bankers Association:
29. See Treasury Reform Proposal, pt. one, subpt. VII, at 54-61.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
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The problems are there and they are quite real; to be equally sure those
problems reflect a nasty blend of cyclical and structural forces; and one
can be especially sure, these problems will not be cured overnight. But
as we agonize about the problems let us not lose sight of the fact that
the banking system has shown, and continues to show, great resiliency
in the face of all its difficulties.32
A. Banking and Commerce
Resiliency notwithstanding, most of us concede that life is uncertain at
best and the need for additional capital remains as vital as ever. The new
Treasury proposals regarding ownership or control of financial holding
companies by non-financial companies force us to reexamine the tradi-
tional separation of banking and commerce.
Historically, combining the users and suppliers of money has gener-
ated strong opposition in the United States mainly because of concerns
about excessive concentration of economic power and the need to insu-
late banks and the deposit insurance system from the fluctuating fortunes
of particular companies. But we have often seen that rigid, statutory
barriers erected for a different banking environment may be counter-
productive in today's marketplace. Hopefully, the Glass-Steagall barri-
ers separating banking and securities are coming down, which is essential
if our banks are to compete in a global marketplace.
With respect to the separation between banking and the thrift indus-
try, perhaps some of the difficulties of that industry could have been
avoided had capital from the banking sector been available to shore up
S&Ls in the 1980s. By "capital" I also mean human capital in the form
of oversight by those with experience in commercial lending. While this
may not have prevented all of the problems, it would certainly have acted
as a brake on some of the riskier ventures if only because shareholder
capital would have been at risk.
Now that the banking sector is looking for additional sources of capi-
32. Mr. Corrigan spoke at the midwinter meeting of the New York State Bankers
Association on January 31, 1991. He added:
As of year-end 1990, the total capital resources of the 10 largest banking organi-
zations in the U.S. were $87 billion, more than three times the level of a decade
ago. Over the same time frame, all widely used capital ratios have about
doubled.
For these same institutions, loan loss reserves alone now aggregatejust over $21
billion. These reserves, which reflect charges against current income or retained
earnings, now represent about two-thirds of non-performing assets. Put differ-
ently, these reserves alone now represent a sizeable cushion against future
charge-offs, quite apart from the $66 billion of equity and other capital re-
sources currently available to these institutions.
Having said that, let me quickly add that in the current circumstances I very
much believe still further enhancements in capital are needed. That is one rea-
son why I applaud the recent steps taken by a number of institutions in further
boosting loan loss reserves and in some cases cutting their dividends-painful as
that may have been....
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tal, a consensus seems to be forming to break down the barrier between
banking and commerce. Countries like Germany and Japan that permit
this have not experienced problems. Even in the United States where we
have had limited experience with so-called nonbank banks, the elimina-
tion of the barrier has not raised significant supervisory concerns. In a
number of European countries and in Japan, interlocks between banks,
insurance companies, securities firms and business corporations have ex-
isted for many years without undue risk. In addition, by owning the
stock of a borrowing company, a bank would be able to participate in
that company's management decisions, possibly acting as a restraining
influence on any risky ventures contemplated by the company.
Certainly, as part of the process of bank reform, we must decide
whether the notion that banking is unique should be preserved or
whether there are offsetting advantages to the financial system by inte-
grating banking and commerce. It appears that Treasury is siding with
those who view the coalescing of banking and commerce as a welcome
development. I, for one, believe it is long overdue!
B. The McFadden Act and Douglas Amendment
Another key element of the Treasury plan33 is the repeal of the Mc-
Fadden Act,' which gives states control over bank branching within
their own borders, and repeal of the Douglas Amendment3 5 to the Bank
Holding Company Act, which reserves state authority over entry into the
state by out-of-state banks. The Treasury proposal would authorize full
nationwide banking for holding companies in three years. National bank
interstate branching would be permitted immediately wherever interstate
banking is permitted, but there would be no preemption of intrastate
branching restrictions. Interstate branching by state banks would be au-
thorized only if authorized by the chartering state.
A similar repeal proposal that was introduced in Congress this year
would allow a state a certain time period in which to enact a law prohib-
iting interstate branching, or significantly qualifying the entry of an out-
of-state branch.36 Be assured, I support efforts to permit branching
across state lines. But I believe that each state should decide whether it
wishes to retain control and supervision over banking activities within its
borders.
While it appears that state-law limitations on branching within a state
and authorized state bank activities will not be disturbed, the proposal
appears to recommend preemption of laws permitting states to determine
the terms of entry of other banks and branches into their states. If state
laws are preempted, state bank charters will lose their value in relation to
33. See Treasury Reform Proposal, pt. one, subpt. VI, at 49-53.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988).
36. See H.R. 624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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national bank charters, resulting in rapid concentration of banking re-
sources to the detriment of local or state control.
The immediate effect of this proposal in New York would be that na-
tional banks could at once come in and begin branching without Banking
Department- approval. It is ironic that the state banking system, which
developed interstate banking and brought it to the level that exists today,
would now be so seriously disadvantaged by the proposed changes. New
York's Banking Law already exempts national banks from the require-
ment of out-of-state banks to obtain state authorization to carry on bank-
ing functions.37 We are encouraging interstate branching still further by
introducing a bill in the state legislature to permit direct interstate state
bank branching on a reciprocal basis. We in New York are no strangers
to interstate banking. We have practiced cross-border branching for over
a hundred years, albeit with foreign banks, and we were the first state in
the United States to permit reciprocal interstate banking.38
I submit, however, that a state is responsible for what goes on within
its own boundaries and should be permitted to determine entry into state
markets as well as branching within the state. Thus, while repeal of both
McFadden and Douglas is attractive to some, others fear it will strip
states of their historic right to permit out-of-state banks to operate within
their borders. Repeal that provides enabling legislation to give states the
option of passing their own laws to prohibit or regulate entry and
branching within a state's own limits is a far better strategy.
From a national standpoint, however, the consequences of interstate
branching need to be thought through. What connection or measure of
control will state banking regulators have over branches that operate in
their jurisdiction? Will examinations be the responsibility of the charter-
ing regulator, as is the case for the CSBS program for multi-state bank
holding company examinations, or for the host regulator, as is the case
for foreign bank branches? Will state law, which protects local interests,
be applicable to all branches from out-of-state banks, whether state and
national, as they are to in-state banks? The proposal recognizes that each
state should have appropriate authority to govern the activities of banks
and branches operating within its borders. And what authority will a
state have to insist that the deposits of its citizens remain in the state
branch or branches, or can they simply be repatriated to the headquar-
ters state?
More to the point, what are the tax consequences of repeal for each
state? There is no more central issue than taxes, as the revenue base of
state after state shrinks. While I am the last one to want interstate
branching defeated by the tax issue, it is something that must be looked
at carefully by all the states and the federal government. If the economy
of any one state is hurt by a decline in tax revenues, it is not going to be a
37. See N.Y. Banking Law § 200 (McKinney 1990).
38. See S. 3840, 214th Leg. Sess., 1991 (New York).
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great place for anyone to continue branching in, or even banking in for
that matter.
To show the inequities of this proposal, seven of the ten largest banks
are located in New York State. Based on this proposal, two can branch
nationwide immediately, while the rest must wait. Is this competitive
equality? And what of foreign banks? Twenty-three of the top twenty-
five are state regulated and will be prohibited from branching immedi-
ately-will this meet the national treatment objective of United States
Department of Treasury for the European Common Market for 19927
And will the proliferation of big bank branches make competition even
tougher, forcing all banks to go after the marginal business? Today,
there are almost 13,000 banks in the United States and 3,000 savings
banks-far too many for all to be profitable. Perhaps we need to think
less of expansion and more about consolidation.
In New York, we have repeatedly urged our banks to think about con-
solidation to strengthen their capital positions and secure greater econo-
mies of scale. At the state level we have been flexible in facilitating
mergers within markets such as Irving Trust with The Bank of New
York, and Fleet/Norstar; between markets such as The Bowery and
Home Savings with H.F. Ahmanson in California; and between indus-
tries, such as Republic National with the Williamsburgh and Manhattan
Savings Banks.
Because there is only a finite amount of credit-worthy lending to go
around, competition for a share of the riskier business that is left can
only lead to bad loans, reduced profitability and diminished capital. I am
convinced that consolidation of banks together with new banking powers
is needed if we are to strengthen the nation's banking system.
C. New Federal Regulation
The Treasury plan would establish a single federal regulator for each
banking organization.39 It would combine the OCC and the OTS into a
single agency as the primary federal regulator of national banks as well
as national and state thrifts. The new agency, called the Federal Banking
Agency (the "FBA"), would also supervise the bank holding companies
of national banks and national and state thrifts." In cases where bank
holding companies have both federal- and state-chartered bank subsidiar-
ies, jurisdiction over the entire organization lies with the charterer of the
largest subsidiary bank or thrift. The Federal Reserve would be assigned
the function of primary federal regulator of state banks and their holding
39. See Treasury Reform Proposal, pt. two, at 67-69.
40. While the Treasury proposal would place SAIF-insured state and federal savings
banks and S&Ls under the jurisdiction of the FBA, there is nothing in the presentation to
indicate clearly which federal agency would regulate state-chartered, BIF-insured Sav-
ings Banks. There are hundreds of these institutions located in the northeast. The New
York State Banking Department supervises 66 such institutions with assets totalling
$83.4 billion.
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companies. Finally, the FDIC would be stripped of all supervisory func-
tions except its power to approve deposit insurance requests and liquida-
tion of insolvent institutions.
What struck me most about the administration's proposal was the to-
tal absence of input from the states and their banking department repre-
sentatives. Indeed, one comes away with the distinct impression that
every effort is being made to preclude responsible participation of state
bank regulators in this debate, even though states regulate two-thirds of
all banks in the United States.
From a state perspective, the plan has two glaring deficiencies. First,
the division of responsibility between the primary federal regulators is
cumbersome and could create considerable confusion: the OCC/OTS su-
pervises state thrifts and the Federal Reserve supervises all state banks,
and because the charterer who has the largest bank has jurisdiction, the
FBA could also regulate state-chartered banks. What if the state-
chartered bank grows to be larger than the national-do we switch
regulators?
In regard to state banks and their relationship to the Federal Reserve
as the federal regulator, it is not yet clear what role the Federal Reserve
will play-whether it will impose its own views on what are acceptable
banking activities by state-chartered institutions. Currently, the FDIC
does not recognize various banking powers as inherently good or trouble-
some; instead, it reviews the activities to determine how the powers are
used by each institution. In contrast, the Federal Reserve takes a more
structured approach and works from an a priori list of acceptable bank-
ing powers. I suspect that clashes between state regulators and the Fed-
eral Reserve over the exercise of these state-empowered activities are
inevitable, which is not altogether bad and reflects the dynamic tension
that often exists between state and federal regulators. The question is:
who has the ultimate veto power? At what point? By institution? By
power? And should it be the state and the insurance fund who determine
this or the state and the Federal Reserve?
On another matter, I question whether the new proposals, if enacted,
will end up requiring state banks to pay fees to both state and federal
regulatory agencies, as S&Ls must do now to the OTS. If so, this
amounts to an added tax burden on state banks that places them at a
disadvantage with federally chartered institutions. Add the deposit in-
surance premium to this and you are fast reaching a point where the
proverbial straw will break the camel's back. This added tax on the state
charter will ultimately pave the way for a "nationalized" banking system,
an outcome that would turn the pendulum of change into a wrecking ball
and lead to the demise of the dual banking system. And if state banks
seek to avoid the additional tax and switch in significant numbers to a
federal charter, it is difficult to predict how the primary federal regula-
tors will pick up the supervisory slack.
We in New York State already know the difficulty of allocating re-
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sources to meet a statutory mandate that requires us to examine every
state-chartered domestic institution on-site once a year. We have done
that and more: like carrying an additional burden for federal regulators
who were forced to reduce their examination schedules in New York to
address emergency situations in the southwest and New England. Under
the new system, one wonders whether some banks will ever see a regula-
tor. A few bankers may think that's a great idea, but when an examiner
finally does come around after a long absence, more drastic remedies
may be required because a supervisory problem was not corrected early
on.
The second deficiency is that eliminating the FDIC as the primary
federal regulator of state banks appears to reduce the FDIC's direct au-
thority to protect insured deposits. The Federal Reserve and FDIC are
independent agencies and the OCC is a creature of Treasury. Will that
have an impact?
We saw what happened in the thrift industry when the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board supervised both the chartering and insurance func-
tions. Experience dictates the wisdom of keeping these functions sepa-
rate. While both are concerned with the safety and soundness of an
institution, the obligations of the chartering agency are different from
those of the insurer, and it is only the healthy tension between the two
that serves the best interests of a bank and its depositors.
D. Restrictions on State Powers
Since the latter part of the 1980s, the federal government has under-
taken an aggressive program to curb the powers of state-chartered insti-
tutions, both through legislation and regulation. Late last year, for
example, the FDIC proposed extending restrictions on federally insured
S&Ls to state-chartered S&Ls covered under SAIF,41 which was estab-
lished by the authority of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (the "FIRREA").42
FIRREA did not extend to state-chartered savings banks and many
S&Ls sought to convert their charters in those states that permitted this
type of institution. New York is one of them; it has been chartering and
supervising savings banks for 150 years and I can assure you that the
powers granted to these banks have been exercised in a prudent manner.
The FDIC claimed, however, that these so-called "charter flips" from an
S&L to a state savings bank put the insurance fund at risk and proposed
that the S&L restrictions be extended to all SAIF-insured state savings
banks as well.
Because none of New York's sixty-six state-chartered savings banks
are SAIF-insured-they are insured by the FDIC's BIF and follow the
same regulations as do commercial banks, including capital require-
41. See 55 Fed. Reg. 51,117 (1990).
42. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
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ments-the rule would have no immediate impact unless the FDIC ex-
tended it to all federally insured institutions. Should that happen-and
the FDIC indicates that it may-there will be several restrictions and
notice requirements placed on savings banks that do not presently exist.
The biggest impact on New York savings banks would be the implicit
extension of the Qualified Thrift Lender (the "QTL") standards for S&Ls
to savings banks by limiting the investments they may pursue. At the
present time, savings banks have a wide range of investment authority
and are not required to devote a specific part of their investments or
loans to home financing.
Sharply curtailing the extent to which a savings bank may diversify its
portfolio under state law raises safety and soundness concerns. From my
perspective, diversity in investment and income source is the key to fi-
nancial stability for all depository institutions, a diversity that would
clearly be lessened for New York savings banks under the FDIC propo-
sal. This diversity, coupled with vigilant supervision, has enabled New
York savings banks to enjoy a broad scope of powers while keeping in-
vestments at safe and prudent levels.
It is the imprudent use of a power by a financial institution that causes
problems for regulators, not any inherent risk associated with any partic-
ular power. While there have been problems at institutions chartered by
some states, the problems have been fewer than among federally
chartered institutions according to Senate Banking Committee data,
which reported that the failure rate was seven percent for national banks,
compared with four percent for state banks from 1987 through 1990."'
These statistics suggest that not only is the blanket usurpation of state
regulation both radical and unnecessary, it may even be dangerous.
The new Treasury proposal also recommends prohibiting direct equity
investment in real estate and other commercial ventures-already pro-
hibited for national banks-for federally insured state banks as well."
Federally insured state-chartered banks would generally be prohibited
from engaging in activities not permitted for national banks unless the
state bank is fully capitalized and the FDIC finds that the activities do
not create a substantial risk of loss to the insurance fund. It also appears
that this effort to force state banks to comply with federal regulatory
limits is gaining considerable support in both houses of Congress."5
In principle, all of these proposals collide head-on with the established
rights of states to grant banking powers that benefit their local communi-
ties. These powers to make direct real estate equity investments, to sell
insurance, to buy and sell securities, and to underwrite government and
corporate securities and commercial paper are not granted irresponsibly.
They are enacted by state legislatures and regulated by state banking de-
43. See Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
44. See Treasury Reform Proposal, pt. one, subpt. V, at 46-48.
45. See H.R. 6, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 3103, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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partments because they are vital to a state's economic interests. It is
important that federal preemption of state legislated prerogatives be well
considered and occur only after a substantial showing of necessity. Even
now, the FDIC plays a significant role in preventing excesses in the use
of state powers, but it does so by moderating rather than attempting to
prohibit the exercise of the state power on the basis of some formula or
legal constraint.
Powers granted at the state level can be beneficial and attract new busi-
ness even if they contribute only indirectly to the bottom line. Back in
the early 1980s, when New York had its own thrift crisis, when the cost
of savings bank deposits exceeded income from assets, the fee income
generated from state-empowered subsidiary businesses provided positive
cash flow. Yet when institutions were brought into a holding company
structure as stand-alone thrifts, it was powers like Savings Bank Life In-
surance (the "SBLI")-the ability of savings banks in the northeast to
act as agents or underwriters of life insurance-that were part of the
divestiture "agreements" with the Federal Reserve. On what grounds?
Safety and soundness? Lack of profitability? Experience? The New
York State Banking Department has been successfully supervising SBLI
for the past fifty-one years, and our supervisory history goes back 162
years.
CONCLUSION
There are many, of course, who argue that Congress should establish,
once and for all, a "nationalized" banking system with uniform powers,
regulations and supervisory requirements at the federal level. The idea
looks good on paper; it is neat and tidy; it sounds fair; it even appears
manageable.
But given the interests of our states and our various banking organiza-
tions, any nationalized banking system would inevitably be a committee
effort, based on a least common denominator factor, and fixing standards
and regulations that may be far more than needed in a state with few
financial institutions but totally insufficient for financial institutions in
New York or Illinois or California.
If our experiences with the thrift crisis and its spillover into commer-
cial banking have taught us anything, they should warn us not to legis-
late detailed prescriptions on products and activities ever again. Rather,
we should construct a safe but flexible regulatory and supervisory frame-
work within which all of our financial institutions-state or national,
commercial or thrift-can respond to market changes.
Over the remainder of this decade, there will truly be a transfiguration
in our banking system. This will include changes in the way it will be
organized and regulated, changes in powers, changes that may unfortu-
nately presage the final shift of economic power from the states to Wash-
ington. Too heavy a hand at the federal level could well create a massive
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and top-heavy banking system unable to respond quickly to changing
market conditions.
Unlike the highly centralized banking systems in Europe and else-
where, the American banking system-if indeed it can even be called a
system-reflects the vast differences that exist among the states, the di-
versity of its peoples and the nation's political structure with the checks
and balances inherent in a federal system.
I believe all of us are aware of the economic problems experienced by
our banking system. The competitiveness and strength of the traditional
bank franchise has been eroded because outdated laws prevent banks
from responding to market forces by entering new lines of business and
achieving geographic diversification; traditional lending opportunities
have decreased and changes in the marketplace have allowed others who
are not similarly regulated to erode the banking industry's franchise.
On the regulatory side, major legislative and regulatory changes did
not keep pace with market changes, causing hardship to financial institu-
tions that suffered from diminishing capital, particularly in the thrift cat-
egory. And the advent of deregulation, without a concomitant expansion
of supervision, created a marketplace vacuum that was all too often ex-
ploited by incompetent or unscrupulous managers and entrepreneurs.
Reform is necessary, even vital, but if it comes by preemptive strike, by
fiat rather than enabling legislation, it will destroy the basic strength of
our dual banking system-the ability of states to act as laboratories for
change, the very thing President Bush addressed so eloquently in his
State of the Union message.
It was the dual banking system that permitted state-regulated banks to
develop marketing innovations, many of which are now integral parts of
our banking system. It was the dual banking system that established our
state banks as laboratories for change, with flexibility to respond effec-
tively to local conditions.
One hopes that reason will ultimately prevail and that what emerges
from Congress will combine the virtues and flexibility of state regulation
with added banking powers, thus enabling our banks to function nation-
wide under an efficient federal regulatory system.
For the United States to remain a strong and vital market, it needs a
strong and vital financial system. It must be a system that is character-
ized by a realistic appreciation of the legitimate objectives of banks in a
competitive environment. And it must recognize the importance of an
open regulatory structure that fosters creative and safe and sound inno-
vation in products and services.
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